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Abstract. This paper considers an acid rain differential game. Countries emit sulphur which is partly
transferred to other countries. Depositions above critical loads ultimately destroy the soil. Countries
face a trade-off between the costs of emission reductions and the damage to the soil due to the
depletion of the acid buffers. Because of the transboundary externalities the outcome will depend
on whether the countries cooperate or not. This paper presents the cooperative outcome and the
open-loop andMarkov-perfect Nash equilibriaof theacid raindifferential game. It willbeshown that
the depositions always converge to the critical loads but the steady-state levels of the buffer stocks
differ. The theory is used to analyse the acid rain differential game for sulphur between Great Britain
and Ireland. Finally, some results are given for the whole of Europe.
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1. Introduction
During the last decade, politicians and natural scientists became more and more
interested in the concept of critical loads for environmental problems. A critical
load is usually deﬁned as the maximal exposure to some pollutant an ecological
system can adjust to without suffering long term damage (Nilsson 1986). Today
the depositions of sulphur and nitrogen oxides exceed the critical loads in many
countries. Emission reductions, however, imply economic costs and, therefore,
economists point at the trade-off between these costs and the damage to the eco-
logical system. Depositions above critical loads are harmful, but also in that case
the environment has some resilience. The more and the longer depositions exceed
critical loads the higher the damage. This can be modelled with a buffer stock
which is depleted as long as the critical loads are not respected and where damage
is a function of the depletion. A quick adjustment to the critical loads does less
harm but is more costly than a slow adjustment. These aspectsintroduce dynamics
into the decision problem.
Emissions of sulphur and nitrogen oxides are not only deposited in the emitting
country but winds take a large part of the pollutants across borders. These trans-
boundary external costs turn the respective decision problems into a game, which
is usually called the acid rain game (M¨ aler 1989; Newbery 1990). More precisely,168 KARL-G¨ ORAN M¨ ALER AND AART DE ZEEUW
since the decision problems of the countries involved are dynamic optimization
problems with a stock variable, the game is a differential game (Bas ¸ar and Olsder
1982; de Zeeuw and van der Ploeg 1991).
In this paper the full cooperative outcome and two non-cooperative Nash equi-
libria forthisacidraindifferentialgamearederived.Intheopen-loopNashequilib-
rium thepoliciesof thecountriesareonlytime-dependent,whereasin thefeedback
Nash equilibrium these policies are contingent on the buffer stocks so that the
countries can indirectly react to each other’s policies. The feedback Nash equilib-
riumisalsodenotedastheMarkov-perfectequilibriumbecauseofthiscontingency
and because it is derived in a dynamic programming framework. The cooperative
outcome and these two Nash equilibria all have the property that in each country
the depositions converge to the critical loads in the long run (see also M¨ aler 1992).
However, the steady-state levels of the buffer stocks differ and these indicate how
seriousthe damageto the environmentis and whetherit is reversible or not. There-
fore, regardless of the mode of behaviour critical loads will be respected in the
long run, but total damage and the risk for the ecological system strongly depend
on it. It will be clear that, in general, cooperative behaviour leads to less damage
but suffers from the prisoners’ dilemma. In this paper it is also shown that the
steady-state levels of the buffer stocks in the feedback Nash equilibrium, which
is the more realistic equilibrium concept, are lower than in the open-loop Nash
equilibrium which implies higher depletion levels and, therefore, more damage to
the environment. This result strengthens the case for international coordination of
environmental policy.
Our approach to the problem in a way reconciles economists, who always
stress trade-offs, and ecologists, who always stress the hardness of ecological
constraints. Ecologists point at the normative aspect of critical loads which returns
in the economic model, outlined above, as the long-run level of depositions. The
acceptance of the critical load concept, however, does not imply, in an economic
model, that the issue of cooperation disappears, because the adjustment process
strongly depends on the mode of behaviour.
The availability of data on the transport of sulphur and nitrogen oxides in
Europe (EMEP 1992) and on the critical loads (Downing et al. 1993) allows some
empirical analyses to be performed within the framework described above. For a
full empirical analysis estimates of the cost and damage functions are also needed.
Damage functions are in general very difﬁcult to estimate and any set of estimated
damagefunctions for acid depositionsfor the whole of Europe does not exist. Cost
functions,however, could be basedon the RAINS project (Alcamo et al. 1990) but
in this paper both cost and damage functions are chosento be simple parametrized
functional forms.
In this contextthe acidrain differential gamefor sulphurdioxidebetweenGreat
Britain and Ireland is analysed. Furthermore, some ﬁrst results are given for the
whole of Europe but it will be shown that this gives rise to new and difﬁcult
theoretical problems, which are the subject of further research. The empiricalTHE ACID RAIN DIFFERENTIAL GAME 169
analysisin this paperis ratherspeciﬁcand mainly meantto illustrate the theoretical
results. An extensive literature exists on different aspects of the sulphur emission
problem in Europe (e.g. Klaassen 1995).
In Section 2 the acid rain differential game is formulated and in Section 3
the steady states for the cooperative and two non-cooperative solution concepts
are derived. It will be shown that the steady-state emissions only depend on the
empirical data on the transport matrix and the critical loads. The steady-state
depletion levels of the acid buffer stocks, however, also depend on the economic
variables suchas the parameters in the cost and damagefunctions and the discount
rate. As a ﬁrst illustration of the theoretical results of this paper, Section 4 presents
thegamebetweenGreatBritainandIreland.Thisistheonlygroupoftwocountries
in Europe within our model for which the background depositions from all other
countries and the sea do not exceed the critical loads already. Section 5 contains
some ﬁrst results for the whole of Europe and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. The Acid Rain Differential Game








n, tons of sulphur




denotes the fraction of country
j’s emissions
e
j that is deposited in country
i,s o
that the vector
Ae is the vector of depositions in the
n countries as a consequence
of the emissions in the same countries. In addition to that each of the countries
receivesthe so-calledbackgrounddepositionsfrom the countriesoutside the group
as well as from the sea.
As indicated in the Introduction, we interprete a critical load as how much
pollution a countrycan assimilateper yearbefore the acid buffers of the soil in that
countryare affected and the soil acidiﬁcationprocessstarts (e.g. Aalbers 1993).To




is done to the soil.2 The different acid buffers are depleted one by one. As long as
the acidiﬁcation process is in the ﬁrst acid buffer, the soil becomes less productive
but can recover when the depositions are at or below the critical load again, so
that the damage is reversible. However, when this buffer is depleted and the next
buffer is activated, the soil cannot recover and will loose some of its productivity
for ever. Moreover, when the last acid buffer is depleted, the soil will evenbecome
non-productive. This very rough sketch of the acidiﬁcation process is sufﬁcient
for the purpose of this paper but more details can be found in the literature (e.g.
Hettelingh 1989).
Critical loads are given as grams of sulphur or nitrogen oxide per year per
square meter and can differ substantially from one region to the other, depending
onthecharacteristicsofthesoil,thebedrock,thevegetationcover,theprecipitation,
etcetera. Since the analysis is performed at the aggregation level of countries, a
measure is needed for a country’s critical load. The data provide critical loads per170 KARL-G¨ ORAN M¨ ALER AND AART DE ZEEUW
region. In order to get a comparable number, the average of the regional critical
loads of a country is multiplied with the surface area of that country. It is clear
that this number is rough and that the conclusions should therefore be treated with
care but a more detailed modelling of this aspect would not give more economic
insights,whichisthefocusofthispaper.Backgrounddepositionsfromthecountries
outside the group and from the sea are assumedto be given. Therefore, when these
background depositions exceed the critical load in one of the countries, the group
cannot control the acidiﬁcation process in that country. In the analysis that follows
it is assumedthat this is not the case.Furthermore, the difference between the total
depositions and the critical loads matters. Therefore, the background depositions
can be substracted on both sides, so that the starting point of the analysis consists
of the internal depositions
Ae, on the one hand, and the critical loads minus the
background depositions, denoted by the vector c, on the other hand. Each country
facesthetrade-offbetweenthecostsofreducingemissionsandthebeneﬁtsoflower
damage to the environment. Each country chooses a time path for its emissions
with theobjectiveto minimizea discountedstream ofcostsanddamagessubjectto
the depletion of the acid buffer stocks. Therefore, the decision problem of country



































































r denotes the interest rate,
C the cost function of the reduction of the
emissions and





that the buffer stocks ﬁll up again, so that it is implicitly assumed that the soil can
recover and that the damage is reversible. It is, however, not clear beforehand if
the resulting steady-state levels of depletion are reversible or not. In the empirical
analysis that follows these steady-state levels will simply be used as an indicator
of how serious the situation is. A more complicated formulation of the optimal
control problem would make the theoretical analysis intractable.
The
n optimal control problems are coupled. Because of the transboundary
pollution, each country inﬂuences the depletion of the acid buffer stocks of the
other countriesand,thus, the welfare of the other countries.Theproblem is a game
and a game composed of optimal control problems is called a differential game
(Bas ¸ar and Olsder 1982; de Zeeuw and van der Ploeg 1991). The static version
with ﬂow pollution instead of stock pollution was called the acid rain game (M¨ aler
1989; Newbery 1990). In that tradition the game of this paper is called the acid
rain differential game.THE ACID RAIN DIFFERENTIAL GAME 171
3. Solutions to the Acid Rain Differential Game
3.1. EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPTS
It is common to start the analysis, as a benchmark, with the open-loop Nash
equilibrium, in which the emissions are only a function of time. The information
structure is simple and one can resort to the techniques of Pontryagin’s minimum
principle to solve the problem. It is, however, more realistic to derive the feedback
Nash equilibrium, in which the emissions are also a function of the current state
of the system, which in this case means the current levels of depletion. Moreover,
by solving the game with dynamic programming a type of subgame perfectness
results (de Zeeuw and van der Ploeg 1991). This means that the players are not
committed to their strategies, and that only the current state matters and not the
path that has led to it (bygones are bygones). The current state reﬂects the part of
the history of the game that is relevant for current and future costs. Therefore the
feedback Nash equilibrium is also called the Markov-perfect equilibrium (Maskin
and Tirole 1988). The open-loop Nash game is essentially a one-shot game. At the
beginning of the game the strategies are chosen for the whole time span and no
new information is received or usedduring the courseof the game. In the feedback
Nashgame,however,countriesconditiontheiremissionsontheobserveddepletion
levels which implies that they indirectly react to past emission choices of the other
countries.3 The strategic interaction becomesdynamic. It cannot be said in general
whether the open-loop or the feedback Nash equilibrium is better for the players.
The state transition (2) is linear. If cost and damage functions are assumed
to be quadratic with the usual convexity conditions, the open-loop and the linear
feedback Nash equilibrium are unique and analytically tractable. However, for
symmetric linear-quadratic differential games with a one-dimensional state space,
it has been shown that also non-linear feedback Nash equilibria exist, which are
better for the players and can even sustain the cooperative outcome (Tsutsui and
Mino1990;DocknerandLong1993).Thislineofresearchstillhastobedeveloped
for the asymmetric case with more than one state variable, which is the type of
model in this paper.
The next step in the analysis is to compare the non-cooperative equilibria with
outcomes that result from cooperation between the countries in order to assess the
beneﬁts of cooperation. Cooperative outcomes are vulnerable because countries
generally have incentives to deviate under the assumption that the other countries
sticktotheircooperativeemissionlevels.Ifallcountriesgiveintotheseincentives,
a non-cooperative equilibrium results where the players typically are worse off.
This situation is usually referred to as the prisoners’ dilemma. A lot of research
in game theory deals with the search for non-cooperative equilibria that sustain
cooperative outcomes. The main result in this area is the well-known folk theorem
for two-player repeated games (Fudenberg and Maskin 1986) which states that,
for a high enough discount factor, the inﬁnite repetition of a static game allows to
construct non-cooperative equilibria that sustain all outcomes that are individually172 KARL-G¨ ORAN M¨ ALER AND AART DE ZEEUW
rationalwithrespecttothemin-maxoutcome.Forspeciﬁcgamesitisevenpossible
to construct equilibria with strong properties like renegotiation proofness (e.g. van
Damme 1989).
Differential games are dynamic games. Therefore, it is to be expected that
the same ideas work in that context. Indeed, one result is that if the players can
condition their strategies notonly on the current state but also on paststates (which
is called a closed-loop memory information structure) non-uniquenessresults with
equilibria that are better for the players than the feedback Nash equilibrium (Bas ¸ar
and Olsder 1982). However, a full folk theorem for differential games does not
exist,exceptunderspecialconditions(GaitsgoryandNitzan1994).Adisadvantage
of a closed-loop memory information structure is the loss of Markov perfectness.
In this paper non-cooperative behaviour will be characterized ﬁrst by the stan-
dard open-loop Nash equilibrium and then by the more complicated but also more
realistic feedback Nash or Markov-perfect equilibrium. Under the assumption of
side payments, cooperative behaviour can be characterized by the full cooperative
outcome, where the countries jointly minimize their total costs. In this way the
beneﬁts of cooperation can be assessed.
3.2. FULL COOPERATIVE OUTCOME
In the full cooperative outcome the countries jointly minimize the total sum of
their objective functionals, given in (1). For simplicity, it is assumed here that all
interestratesareequal.Furthermore,inordertobeabletoderivethefeedbackNash
equilibrium in Section 3.4, it is also assumed that the cost and damage functions








































Since no full set of estimated cost and damage functions is available, on the basis
of which the parameters of these functions could be calibrated, the parameters
are just guessed at but also varied in order to check the robustness of the results.
Note, however, that
￿ and
￿ are in fact one parameter since one of the two can be
normalized to 1. The relative magnitude expressesthe relative weight that is given
to emission reduction costs, on the one hand, and environmental damage costs, on
the other hand. One can say: the higher its
￿/
￿ the greener the preferences of that
country. Furthermore, the parameter
￿
e of the cost function must be chosen high
enough in order to ensure that this cost function has a realistic form in the range of
analysis, namely decreasing (which implies that the marginal emission reduction
costs are increasing). If a country has already reduced emissions substantially, the
marginal cost can be expected to be high. Therefore, the set of values of
￿
e will
be chosen such that countries with lower per capita sulphur emissions have higher
marginal emission reduction costs.THE ACID RAIN DIFFERENTIAL GAME 173
The optimality conditions for the full cooperative outcome, given by Pontryag-





















































































denoting the dynamic shadow values of the depletion of the acid buffer stocks.
Upon substitution of the optimal emission levels, given by (6), into equation
(4),asystemof differential equations(4)–(5) results,whichhasasaddlepointequi-
librium for small enough values of the interest rate
r. Because of the transversality
conditions for the co-state
p, the optimal path jumps to the stable manifold and































Note that the steady-state values do not depend on the initial values of depletion
but the transient path of course will depend on it.








which implies that the optimal path converges to a situation where the depositions
are equal to the critical loads. It is assumed here that the values of the parameters
of the problem are such that the resulting steady-state depletion and emission
levelsare non-negative,which is not necessarilythe case,becausethe off-diagonal
elements of the inverse of the transport matrix
A (and
A
T) are usually negative.
We will return to this in Section 5.
3.3. OPEN-LOOP NASH EQUILIBRIUM
The difference with the full-cooperative outcome above is that the countries mini-
mizetheir objectivefunctionalsseparately,given thedynamicconstraintsandtheir
expectationsabout the emissionpaths of the other countries.The Nashequilibrium
requiresconsistencyoftheresultingoptimalemissionpathsandtheseexpectations.




















































































Note that for each country
i only the
i-th component of the co-state vector matters
becausecountry
i isnowonly interestedinthe damagecausedbyits own depletion
level. Therefore, equation (10) is a scalar equation, and in equation (11) only the
a
i
i element of the transport matrix
A matters. In fact country
i expects the other
countries to choose their Nash emission paths and, therefore, treats the resulting
depositions as given background depositions.
For each country
i, substitution of the Nash equilibrium emission levels, given
byequation(11),intothedifferentialequation(9)againleadstoasaddlepointequi-
librium for small enough values of the interest rate
r. Because of the transversality
conditions for the co-states
p























d is a diagonal matrix with the diagonal from the transport matrix
A.I ti s








In both the full cooperative outcome and the non-cooperative open-loop Nash
equilibrium, the depositions converge in the long run to the critical loads, which
gives this concept some normative signiﬁcance. However, there are two important
differencesbetweenthesemodesofbehaviour.Theﬁrstisthespeedofconvergence,
which is given by the stable eigenvalues of the resulting system of differential
equations. The second is the steady-state value of the vector of depletion levels,
which is given by equations (7) and (12) respectively. This value indicates how




because without transboundary pollution there is no game, so that cooperative




given by equation (7), are smaller than or equal to the steady-state depletion levels
d
N in the open-loop Nash equilibrium, given by equation (12), but it can be shown
that this is not generally true.
3.4. FEEDBACK NASH EQUILIBRIUM
The Nash equilibrium of problem (1)–(3), derived in a dynamic programming
framework with the depletion levels as states, is called the feedback Nash equilib-
rium in the theory of differential games. At each point in time for each depletionTHE ACID RAIN DIFFERENTIAL GAME 175
level the countries play a Nash game with the costs-to-go (the value functions) as
objectives. Emissions become a function of the current depletion levels and the
equilibrium is Markov-perfect. Since the constraints (2) are linear and the objec-
tives (3) are quadratic, a unique linear equilibrium for quadratic value functions
results under the usual convexity assumptions.Note, however, that also non-linear
feedback Nash equilibria may exist (see Section 3.1).

































































































that the value functions are not time-dependent either. The ﬁrst term in each of the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations is therefore equal to zero and the parameters
K and
g are constant.




































Substitution of the Nash equilibrium emission levels, given by equation (16), and
the expressions for the value functions, given by equation (14), in the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equations (15) leads to quadratic equations in d. The coefﬁcients
of the quadratic term andthe linear term haveto beequal to zero, which after some























































































































































= 0 (18)176 KARL-G¨ ORAN M¨ ALER AND AART DE ZEEUW
for the vector parameters
g
i,


















































































It is not difﬁcult to see that in the steady state the depositions are equal to the
critical loads. The problem is how to ﬁnd (symmetric) solutions to the coupled
algebraic Riccati equations (17) that yield stable dynamics in equation (19). After




i to each of the last two terms in equation (17),
the equation ﬁts for each
i the format of the algebraic matrix Riccati equation
for linear-quadratic regulator design in the Matlab Control System Toolbox. This






i. A simple iterative procedure then solves the set of equations,
after which the check for stability can be made.4
Because it makes sense to assume that the emission policies are contingent on
the observeddepletion levels, the feedbackNash equilibrium conceptis more real-
istic than the open-loop concept. Moreover, the dynamic programming framework
yields Markov perfectness.
In a paper with a differential game model for the greenhouse effect (van der
Ploeg and de Zeeuw 1992) it was shown that the steady-state level of accumulated
greenhousegases in the feedbackNash equilibrium is higher than in the open-loop
Nash equilibrium. The reason is that each country expects partly offsetting reac-
tions from the other countries in a feedback information structure and, therefore,
emits more in equilibrium. Although we were not able to prove this general result
for the model in this paper, it will be conﬁrmed in the next two sections where the
acid rain differential games between Great Britain and Ireland and for the whole
of Europe are analysed respectively, although the effect is rather small. It implies
that the beneﬁts of cooperation are a bit higher when the conceptually more real-
istic equilibrium concept is used, which strengthens the need for cooperation on
emission policies.
4. Great Britain and Ireland
Great Britain andIreland form the only groupof two Europeancountriesfor which
all the background depositions from the countries outside the group and from the
sea do not exceedthe critical loads already.It should be noted that this observation
is based on the very rough measures that are calculated in this paper. The larger
the group of countries considered the more room these countries have to (jointly)
control the acidiﬁcation of their soils.THE ACID RAIN DIFFERENTIAL GAME 177
ThetransportmatrixofsulphurisderivedfromthepublicationsoftheEuropean
Programme for Monitoring and Evaluationin Oslo (EMEP, Acid News 1992).The
critical loadsfor the regionsaretakenfrom anRIVM report (Downinget al. 1993).
Emission and transport data are available at the country level, but also a critical
load per country is needed. As indicated in Section 2, this value is determined by
multiplying the average critical load with the total area of that country. The units
are 100 tons of sulphur per year.













Becausethe area of Great Britain is three to four times as big as the area of Ireland
and the average critical loads are about the same, the critical load of Great Britain
is three to four times as big as the critical load of Ireland: 1077 and 303 tons,
respectively. The background depositions from outside Great Britain and Ireland
are 711 and 137, so that the critical loads minus these background depositions are
166 for Ireland and 366 for Great Britain.
Thesteady-stateemissionlevels for the full cooperativeoutcomeandboth non-



























Theemissionsin the baseyear(which is the averageof 1990 and1991) are 840 for
Ireland and 19160 for Great Britain. This leads to the ﬁrst interesting observation.
In order to meet the critical load Great Britain has to reduce emissions drastically
to about 6% of the current level, which is so beneﬁcial for Ireland that this country
only has to reduce its emissions by about 11% to meet the critical load. If the
countries do not realize that a game is played and consider each other’s current
emissionsasadditionalbackgrounddepositions,theinteractiondisappearsandtwo
separate pollution control problems have to be solved. Then the outcome is that
Great Britain has to reduce emissions down to 1145 and Ireland down to 261 in
order to meet the respective critical loads. It follows that the gaming aspect of the
problem relaxes the task of Ireland considerably. Some sensitivity analysis on the
data has shown that it can even happen that Ireland may increase its emissions
above the current level and still meet the critical load because of this interaction!
Great Britain is then forced to bring down emissions even further than in the
separate pollution control case.
The parameters
￿
i of the cost functions in equation (3) are normalized to 1 and
the parameters
￿
i of the damage functions in equation (3) are ﬁrst also set equal to
1 and then varied in order to study the effect of changing preferences with respect178 KARL-G¨ ORAN M¨ ALER AND AART DE ZEEUW
to emission reduction costs, on the one hand, and environmental damage costs, on
the other hand. The parameters
￿
e of the cost functions are chosen such that for
current emission levels the product of marginal emission reduction costs and per
capita emissions is constant and such that the cost function is decreasing in the
range of analysis (see Section 3.2):
￿
e becomes 105690 for Ireland and 91600 for
Great Britain.
The interest rate is set equal to 4%. Because the eigenvalues of the system
of differential equations (4)–(6) for the full cooperative outcome are (
￿0.2700,
￿0.1735, 0.3100, 0.2135) and the eigenvalues of the system of differential equa-
tions (9)–(11) for the open-loop Nash equilibrium are (
￿0.2447,
￿0.1927,0.2847,
0.2327), the interest rate is indeed small enough to have saddlepoint equilibria for
these systems.
The coupled algebraic matrix Riccati equations (17) are solved with the algo-
rithm described in Section 3.4. The solution to the coupled algebraic tracking
equations (18) follows easily. Because the eigenvalues of the differential equa-
tion (19) are (
￿0.2445,
￿0.1925), the system is stable and the depletion levels
converge to the steady state. The speed of convergence, however, is smaller than
for the open-loop Nash equilibrium and this indicates already that the steady-state
depletion levels in the feedback Nash equilibrium will be higher.
Finally, thesteady-statedepletionlevelsfor thefull cooperativeoutcome,given
in equation (7), for the open-loop Nash equilibrium, given in equation (12), and
for the feedback Nash equilibrium, given in equation (20), are calculated for the

























These numbers partly depend on the data on the transport matrix and the critical
loads, but also partly on the assumptions on the cost and damage functions such as
functional form and parameter values. Therefore, these numbers only have some
relativemeaning:thehigherthesteady-statevaluesofthedepletionlevelsthemore
damage is done to the environment in the process of adapting the emissions to the
critical loads. Moreover, high values also indicate a higher chance on irreversible
damage or even a break-down of the ecological system.
The full cooperative outcome is especially beneﬁcial for Ireland. Compared
with the Nash equilibria Great Britain has not much to gain from cooperation and
will therefore have to be compensated to do so. The feedback Nash equilibrium
has somewhat higher depletion levels than the open-loop Nash equilibrium, whichTHE ACID RAIN DIFFERENTIAL GAME 179
means that the use of the less realistic open-loop equilibrium concept underesti-
matessomewhatthepossiblebeneﬁtsofcooperationinthecontroloftransboundary
pollution.
The effects of varying the parameters
￿
i are as to be expected. Increasing
￿
i
implies that a higher weight is put on environmental damage, so that the speed of
convergence in all cases goes up and the steady-state depletion levels go down.
The numbers will be omitted here.
5. Europe
In this section the analysis of Section 4 is performed for the whole of Europe.
The sulphur transport matrix and the initial sulphur emissions are provided by
the EMEP and the critical loads are based on the RIVM report. Three countries
are not included in the analysis: Luxemburg, because it is too small, and Iceland
and Turkey, because no critical loads are available. Furthermore, East and West
Germanyare uniﬁed.However,no separatedataare availablefor the countriesthat
usedtoformCzechoslovakia,theSovietUnion(theEuropeanpart)andYugoslavia,
so that these countries are still treated as one in the analysis. Finally, data on the
total area and the population of the countries are taken from the Times Atlas.
In Table I the transport matrix A is given. The EMEP provides the matrix
of contributions of sulphur from one country to the other and the total sulphur
emissions for each country. The columns of this matrix are divided by the total
emissions to get the fractions of the matrix A. The total sulphur emissions (the
average of years 1990 and 1991) are the initial emissions of the game and can be
found in Table II. This table also provides for each country the critical load (which
is the average critical load per square meter times the area of the country), the
backgrounddeposition,the total population(which is usedto determine a value for
the cost parameterby relating marginal emission reductioncosts andthe emissions
per capita), the steady-state emissions and the steady-state depletion levels for the
full cooperative outcome, the open-loop Nash equilibrium and the feedback Nash
equilibrium. The eigenvalues are not reported but, as in Section 4, the systems for
the full cooperative outcome and the open-loop Nash equilibrium prove to have
saddlepoints and the dynamic system for the feedback Nash equilibrium proves to
be stable. These eigenvalues again indicate the speed of convergence and increase
when the weight on environmental damage costs is increased.
The steady-state depletion levels for the feedback Nash equilibrium are again a
bithigherthanfor theopen-loopNashequilibrium,becausethe countriescondition
their emissions on the depletion levels which results in a dynamic interaction
making the countries worse off. The explanation is as follows. The reaction to
higher levels is lower emissions. Each country takes this reaction of the other
countries into account, which implies that in equilibrium the countries emit more.
It is interesting to compare the results for the European game with the results
for the game between Great Britain and Ireland in Section 4. Comparing the full180 KARL-G¨ ORAN M¨ ALER AND AART DE ZEEUW
Table I.
AL AT BE BG CS DK FI FR DE GR HU IE
AL 0.164 0 0 0.004 0.001 0 0 0 0 0.007 0.002 0
AT 0 0.253 0.010 0 0.023 0.003 0 0.013 0.016 0 0.014 0.001
BE 0 0 0.194 0 0.001 0.001 0 0.019 0.004 0 0 0.002
BG 0.016 0.004 0.001 0.249 0.004 0.001 0 0.001 0.002 0.014 0.014 0
CS 0 0.049 0.012 0.001 0.255 0.007 0.002 0.010 0.044 0 0.059 0.002
DK 0 0 0.005 0 0.002 0.113 0.001 0.002 0.005 0 0 0.002
FI 0 0 0.003 0 0.003 0.015 0.300 0.002 0.005 0 0.001 0.002
FR 0 0.010 0.091 0 0.010 0.006 0 0.326 0.018 0 0.005 0.013
DE 0 0.039 0.132 0 0.070 0.041 0.002 0.081 0.307 0 0.009 0.014
GR 0.032 0.002 0.001 0.041 0.002 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.196 0.005 0
HU 0 0.035 0.003 0.002 0.022 0.002 0 0.003 0.007 0.001 0.264 0
IE 0 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 0.001 0.001 0 0 0.214
IT 0.008 0.037 0.010 0.003 0.013 0.003 0 0.025 0.010 0.006 0.022 0.001
NL 0 0 0.048 0 0.001 0.002 0 0.011 0.006 0 0 0.004
NO 0 0 0.010 0 0.003 0.029 0.009 0.004 0.006 0 0.001 0.011
PL 0 0.025 0.029 0.002 0.086 0.041 0.006 0.015 0.101 0 0.036 0.005
P T 00000000 . 0 0 1 0000
RO 0.012 0.012 0.003 0.028 0.020 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.009 0.006 0.071 0
ES 0 0 0.007 0 0.001 0.002 0 0.018 0.003 0 0 0.005
SE 0 0.002 0.012 0 0.006 0.090 0.047 0.005 0.012 0 0.002 0.007
CH 0 0.006 0.006 0 0.003 0.002 0 0.016 0.004 0 0.002 0.001
SU 0.008 0.037 0.037 0.025 0.077 0.092 0.183 0.020 0.070 0.009 0.099 0.011
GB 0 0 0.019 0 0.002 0.005 0 0.012 0.005 0 0 0.079
YU 0.060 0.053 0.006 0.032 0.023 0.003 0.001 0.007 0.012 0.013 0.081 0.001
Source: Acid News (1992).
cooperative outcome with the Nash equilibria, Great Britain now has a lot to
gain from cooperation whereas the gains for Ireland are not much higher than in
the two-country game. Another interesting point is that for Ireland the steady-state
emissionsarenowhigherthantheinitialemissions,sothatthiscountrycanincrease
its emissions. The same holds for Greece, Portugal, Spain and the former Soviet
Union. These countries have in common that they are border states in Europe, so
thatmuchoftheiremissionsisnotaconcernintheEuropeancontext.Furthermore,
the average critical load per square meter is very high in Greece, Portugal and the
former Soviet Union, and the total area is very high in the former Soviet Union.
This might explain why it is possible to have an increase in emissions in these
countries. However, for most countries a very drastic reduction of emissions is
needed to meet the critical loads.
The analysis in this section has one serious drawback. In Table II it can be
seenthat some of the steady-state emission levels and some of the full-cooperative
steady-state depletion levels are negative.5 The analysis in Section 3 was based onTHE ACID RAIN DIFFERENTIAL GAME 181
Table I. (continued).
IT NL NO PL PT RO ES SE CH SU GB YU
AL 0.002 0 0 0.001 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 0 0.005
AT 0.018 0.007 0 0.008 0 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.039 0 0.002 0.012
BE 0 0.025 0 0.001 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0.006 0
BG 0.002 0.001 0 0.004 0 0.040 0 0 0 0.003 0.001 0.018
CS 0.004 0.010 0 0.034 0 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.001 0.003 0.012
DK 0 0.008 0.006 0.002 0 0 0 0.006 0 0 0.006 0
FI 0 0.004 0.015 0.007 0 0.001 0 0.047 0 0.010 0.003 0.001
FR 0.022 0.045 0 0.005 0.009 0.001 0.029 0.002 0.052 0 0.021 0.006
DE 0.008 0.116 0.006 0.022 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.007 0.071 0.001 0.029 0.003
GR 0.003 0.001 0 0.002 0 0.011 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.007
HU 0.006 0.003 0 0.010 0 0.013 0 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.032
I E 00 . 0 0 2 000000000 . 0 0 6 0
IT 0.265 0.007 0 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.065 0.001 0.006 0.036
N L 00 . 1 5 0 00 . 0 0 1 0000000 . 0 1 1 0
NO 0 0.013 0.212 0.004 0 0.001 0.001 0.027 0 0.003 0.016 0
PL 0.003 0.030 0.006 0.330 0 0.009 0.001 0.016 0.007 0.005 0.011 0.010
PT 0 0 0 0 0.225 0 0.010 0 0 0 0 0
RO 0.005 0.003 0 0.017 0 0.314 0 0.002 0 0.009 0.001 0.051
ES 0.004 0.005 0 0.001 0.105 0 0.265 0 0.003 0 0.005 0.001
SE 0 0.019 0.079 0.010 0 0.002 0 0.275 0 0.004 0.014 0.001
CH 0.014 0.004 0 0.001 0 0 0.002 0 0.265 0 0.002 0.001
SU 0.007 0.042 0.036 0.164 0.001 0.094 0.002 0.096 0.007 0.413 0.021 0.032
GB 0 0.021 0.003 0.002 0.001 0 0.002 0.002 0 0 0.262 0
YU 0.032 0.005 0 0.013 0 0.022 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.001 0.002 0.327
theassumptionthatthisisnotthecase.Itisnotdifﬁculttoseewhyithappens.Non-
negative emissions result from equation (8) if and only if the vector c of critical
loads minus background depositions is an element of the non-negative span of the
columns of the transport matrix A. If A is a diagonal matrix, which means that
the emissions are only deposited in the country of origin, this condition is always
satisﬁed. However, in case of transboundary pollution, which implies off-diagonal
elements in the matrix A, this is not generally true. For the game between Great
Britain and Ireland in Section 4 the condition was satisﬁed but it broke down for
the European game. The negative depletion levels can be explained in the same
way with equation (7) and the matrix A
T.
Unfortunately this problem does not have an easy answer. The dynamics in
the formulation of the problem (1)–(2) will change. In this paper it is implicitly




c but it is of course more precise








c is not feasible for non-
negativeemissionsthecountrieswillpartitionintotwogroups.Intheﬁrstgroupthe
steady-state depositions are equal to the critical loads with corresponding positive182 KARL-G¨ ORAN M¨ ALER AND AART DE ZEEUW
Table II.








Albania AL 250 196 69 3.25 183 733.23 792.85 798.66
Austria AT 490 268 168 7.76
￿643 578.85 627.73 641.05
Belgium BE 2100 208 63 9.85 145
￿125.02 245.32 253.66
Bulgaria BG 5150 1109 216 9.01 1255 22.02 76.43 77.58
Czechoslovakia CS 12820 1279 226 15.68 3039
￿58.68 63.40 66.67
Denmark DK 1330 241 74 5.14 1179
￿63.28 343.20 349.67
Finland FI 1280 809 360 4.99
￿1254 82.48 133.22 135.84
France FR 6030 3046 810 56.56 4502 185.55 289.99 297.67
Germany DE 31220 856 620 78.50
￿2282 28.45 125.52 130.73
Greece GR 2500 1848 272 10.27 6694 165.59 201.01 202.88
Hungary HU 5050 1116 152 10.34 2704
￿4.13 81.09 83.67
Ireland IE 840 303 92 3.52 875 117.66 195.66 196.49
Italy IT 12030 2048 627 57.69 3834 85.72 193.70 197.53
Netherlands NL 1190 181 76 15.02 120 645.98 841.90 872.15
Norway NO 330 518 454 4.24
￿1134 513.87 608.76 621.94
Poland PL 16050 1751 578 38.18 1254 51.92 90.06 92.47
Portugal PT 1060 623 93 10.53 1442 397.09 441.55 445.52
Romania RO 9000 2850 396 23.19 4221 66.64 88.22 89.82
Spain ES 10950 6059 521 38.99 19934 74.77 121.05 122.34
Sweden SE 1020 720 509 8.62
￿591 240.00 310.13 320.40
Switzerland CH 310 182 88 6.71
￿290 668.36 819.44 829.83
Soviet Union SU 44650 42214 5581 83.13 86350
￿6.40 4.70 4.76
Great Britain GB 19160 1077 338 55.51 2129 32.67 136.64 137.72
Yugoslavia YU 7400 1433 535 23.90 344 44.85 107.29 110.34
e0: initial emission; cl: critical load; bd: background deposition; pop: population
￿ 10
6;










e0, cl, bd, pop: Acid News (1992), RIVM (1993), Times Atlas (1992).
steady-state depletion levels, and in the second group the steady-state depositions
are smaller than the critical loads with corresponding zero steady-state depletion
levels. However, in this way the differential game becomes very complex. A lot
of further research is needed before a proper analysis of the acid rain differential
game for the whole of Europe can be presented.
6. Conclusions
The acid rain game is a dynamic game because the depletion of acid buffer stocks
matters and not so much the ﬂow of pollutants. On the other hand, in the steady
state, the ﬂow of pollutants cannot exceed the critical load. This paper analyses a
model that integrates these two aspects.
It has beenargued that the issue of cooperationand non-cooperationdisappears
when all the countries accept the concept of critical load. This is true for steady-THE ACID RAIN DIFFERENTIAL GAME 183
state emission levels but not for steady-state depletion levels and the transition to
the steady state. The policy issue is not so much the critical load but the speed
of convergence to the critical load and the amount of damage that is done to the
ecological system in this transition process. From this point of view cooperation
or non-cooperation matters a lot.
In this paper the full-cooperative outcome,the open-loopNash equilibrium and
the feedback Nash (or Markov-perfect) equilibrium for the acid rain differential
game are derived. In all three cases the depositions converge to the critical loads
but the speed of convergence and the steady-state depletion levels differ.
ThemodelisusedtoanalysetheacidraindifferentialgameforGreatBritainand
Ireland as well as for the whole of Europe. It is shown that beneﬁts of cooperation
exist even when the concept of critical loads is accepted, and that these beneﬁts
are higher when non-cooperative behaviour is modelled as a feedback Nash equi-
librium. Most countries have to reduce their emissions drastically in order to meet
the critical loads, which can be so beneﬁcial for some countries that they can even
increase their emissions. Note that no side payments are needed for this because
it also happens when all countries only act in their own interest. However, side
payments may be needed to sustain the full cooperative outcome. The empirical
results should be treated with care, because the critical load numbers are not very
precise.
Theanalysisinthispaperassumesthatthetransportmatrixandthecriticalloads
are such that the depositions can be equal to the critical loads in all countries at
once.This is true for the caseof Great Britain andIreland but unfortunately not for
the whole of Europe. When this assumption does not hold the analysis becomes
very complex and has to be subject of further research. Another point is that the
empirical part of this paper only considers a part of the acid rain problem, namely
sulphur. It is, however, straightforward to apply the theory to the data on nitrogen
oxides and ammonia as well. Finally, the analysis is deterministic but this does not
mean that we are not aware of the many uncertainties surrounding these problems.
Notes
1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 5th EAERE Annual Conference in Dublin,
Ireland, at a HCM workshop in Rethymnon, Crete, and a NATO workshop in Wageningen,




2. To be more precise, in the beginning of the acidiﬁcation process no damage is done to the soil
and even more nutrients become available for the plants, but this aspect is left out of the analysis.
We are grateful to Arne Jernel¨ of for pointing this out to us.
3. One would like to model here that a country has better information on its own stock than on
the stocks of the other countries but this is quite difﬁcult. Therefore one has to choose from
two alternatives: countries observe all stocks or just their own stock. We have chosen the ﬁrst
alternative.
4. No conditions are known for convergence of this algorithm. However, we found convergence to
the same outcome from differentstartingpoints and others found the same for similaralgorithms.184 KARL-G¨ ORAN M¨ ALER AND AART DE ZEEUW
5. InthestreetsofHaifatheecologistDanCohenarguedthatnegativedepositions canbeinterpreted
as the use of limestone. In fact he put forward that acidiﬁcation is not a problem because of the
ample availability of limestone but he did not fully convince us.
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